Risk Shocks and Housing Markets by Dorofeenko, Victor et al.
IHS Economics Series
Working Paper 249
February 2010
Risk Shocks and Housing Markets
Victor Dorofeenko
Gabriel S. Lee
Kevin D. Salyer
Impressum
Author(s):
Victor Dorofeenko, Gabriel S. Lee, Kevin D. Salyer
Title:
Risk Shocks and Housing Markets
ISSN: Unspecified 
2010 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1973/
  
 
 
 
  
Risk Shocks and Housing 
Markets
Victor Dorofeenko, Gabriel S. Lee, Kevin D. Salyer 
249 
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
 
  
 
 
  
249 
Reihe Ökonomie 
Economics Series 
Risk Shocks and Housing 
Markets
Victor Dorofeenko, Gabriel S. Lee, Kevin D. Salyer 
 
February 2010 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
Contact: 
 
Victor Dorofeenko 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
1060 Vienna, Austria 
: +43/1/599 91-183 
email: victor.dorofeenko@ihs.ac.at 
 
Gabriel S. Lee 
IREBS 
University of Regensburg 
Universitätsstraße 31 
93053 Regensburg, Germany 
: ++49/941/943.5060 
email: gabriel.lee@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de 
and 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
 
Kevin D. Salyer (Corresponding Author) 
Department of Economics 
University of California 
Davis, CA 95616, USA 
email: kdsalyer@ucdavis.edu 
Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the 
economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian
Federal Ministry of Education and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the
first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in 
Austria. The Economics Series presents research done at the Department of Economics and Finance
and aims to share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. As usual, authors bear
full responsibility for the content of their contributions.  
 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) wurde im Jahr 1963 von zwei prominenten Exilösterreichern –
dem Soziologen Paul F. Lazarsfeld und dem Ökonomen Oskar Morgenstern – mit Hilfe der Ford-
Stiftung, des Österreichischen Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und der Stadt Wien gegründet und ist
somit die erste nachuniversitäre Lehr- und Forschungsstätte für die Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
wissenschaften in Österreich. Die Reihe Ökonomie bietet Einblick in die Forschungsarbeit der 
Abteilung für Ökonomie und Finanzwirtschaft und verfolgt das Ziel, abteilungsinterne
Diskussionsbeiträge einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche
Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den Autoren und Autorinnen. 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the role of uncertainty in a multi-sector housing model with financial 
frictions. We include time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in the technology shocks that 
affect housing production. The analysis demonstrates that risk shocks to the housing 
production sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for the business cycle. 
Also, we demonstrate that bankruptcy costs act as an endogenous markup factor in housing 
prices; as a consequence, the volatility of housing prices is greater than that of output, as 
observed in the data. The model can also account for the observed countercyclical behavior 
of risk premia on loans to the housing sector. 
 
Keywords 
Agency costs, credit channel, time-varying uncertainty, residential investment, housing 
production, calibration 
JEL Classification 
E4, E5, E2, R2, R3 
  
Comments 
We wish to thank David DeJong, Aleks Berenten, and Alejandro Badel for useful comments and
suggestions. We also benefitted from comments received during presentations at: the Humboldt 
University, University of Basel, European Business School, Latin American Econometric Society 
Meeting 2009, and AREUEA 2010. We are especially indebted to participants in the UC Davis and IHS
Macroeconomics Seminar for insightful suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. We also 
gratefully acknowledge financial support from Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank 
(Jubiläumsfondsprojekt No. 13040). 
Contents 
1 Introduction 1 
2 Model Description 3 
2.1 Production   ..............................................................................................................   3 
2.1.1 Firms   ......................................................................................................................   3 
2.1.2 Households ..............................................................................................................   7 
2.2 The Credit Channel   ................................................................................................   9 
2.2.1 Housing Entrepreneurial Contract   ..........................................................................   9 
2.2.2 Housing Entrepreneurial Consumption and House Prices   ...................................   14 
2.2.3 Financial Intermediaries   .......................................................................................   16 
3 Equilibrium 16 
4 Calibration and Data 20 
5 Results 24 
5.1 Steady State Values, Second Moments and Lead - Lag Patterns   .......................   24 
5.2 Dynamics: Impulse Response Functions   .............................................................   27 
5.3 Some Final Remarks   ...........................................................................................   29 
References 3 
6 Data Appendix 3 
Figures 3 
 
 
 

1 Introduction
The Great Recession of 2009 has dramatically underscored the importance that nancial and
housing markets have for the behavior of the macroeconomy. To better understand the role that
these markets play in aggregate uctuations, this paper presents a calibrated general equilibrium
model that incorporates these factors but also introduces an impulse mechanism, time varying
uncertainty, that, until recently, has not received much attention in the literature.1 In particular,
we analyze the role of time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) in a multi-sector real business
cycle model that includes housing production (developed by Davis and Heathcote, (2005)) and a
nancial sector with lending under asymmetric information (e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst, (1997),
(1998); Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer, (2008)). We model risk shocks as a mean preserving spread
in the distribution of the technology shocks a¤ecting house production and explore how changes
in uncertainty a¤ect equilibrium characteristics.2
Our aim in examining this environment is twofold. First, we want to develop a framework
that can capture one of the main components of the current nancial crises, namely, changes in
the risk associated with the housing sector. In our analysis, we focus entirely on the variations in
risk associated with the production of housing and the consequences that this has for lending and
economic activity. Hence our analysis is very much a fundamental-based approach so that we side
step the delicate issue of modeling housing bubbles and departures from rational expectations. The
results, as discussed below, suggest (to us) that this conservative approach is warranted.3 Second,
we want to cast the analysis of risk shocks in a model that is broadly consistent with some of
1 Some recent papers that have examined the e¤ects of uncertainty in a DSGE framework include Bloom et al.
(2008), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009), and Christiano et al. (2008). The last paper is most closely related to
the analysis presented here in that it also uses a credit channel model.
2 Some of the recent works which also examine housing and credit are: Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2008) in which a new-Keynesian DGSE two sector model is used in their empirical analysis;
Iacoviello (2005) analyzes the role that real estate collateral has for monetary policy; and Aoki, Proudman and
Vliegh (2004) analyse house price amplication e¤ects in consumption and housing investment over the business
cycle. None of these analyses use risk shocks as an impulse mechanism.
3 In a closely related analysis, Kahn (2008) also uses a variant of the Davis and Heathcote (2005) framework
in order to analyze time variation in the growth rate of productivity in a key sector (consumption goods). He
demonstrates that a change in regime growth, combined with a learning mechanism, can account for some of the
observed movements in housing prices.
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the important stylized facts of the housing sector such as: (i) residential investment is about
twice as volatile as non-residential investment and (ii) residential investment and non-residential
investment are highly procyclical.4
To that end, we employ the Davis and Heathcote (2005) housing model which, as demonstrated
by the authors, can replicate the high volatility observed in residential investment despite the
absence of any frictions in the economy. The recent analysis in Christiano et al. (2008), however,
provides compelling evidence that nancial frictions play an important role in business cycles and,
given the recent nancial events, it seems reasonable to investigate this role when combined with
a housing sector.5 Consequently, we modify the Davis and Heathcote (2005) analysis by adding
a nancial sector in the economy and require that housing producers must nance their inputs
via loans from the banking sector. This modication appears to be important; for instance, we
show that by incorporating an explicit nancial market into this model, we can produce large
movements in housing prices, a feature of the data that was missing in the Davis and Heathcote
(2005) analysis. We also demonstrate that housing prices in our model are a¤ected by expected
bankruptcies and the associated agency costs; these serve as an endogenous, time-varying markup
factor a¤ecting the price of housing. The volatility in this markup translates into increased
volatility in housing prices. Moreover, the model implies that this endogenous markup to housing
as well as the risk premium associated with loans to the housing sector should be countercyclical;
both of these features are seen in the data.6
Our analysis nds that plausible calibrations of the model with time varying uncertainty pro-
duce a quantitatively meaningful role for uncertainty over the housing and business cycles. For
4 One other often mentioned stylized fact is that housing prices are persistent and mean reverting (e.g. Glaser
and Gyourko (2006)). See Figure 1 and Table 4 for these cyclical and statistical features during the period of 1975
until the second quarter of 2007.
5 Christiano et al. (2008) use a New Keynesian model to analyze the relative importance of shocks arising in
the labor and goods markets, monetary policy, and nancial sector. They nd that time-varying second moments,
i.e. risk shocks, are quantitatively important relative to the the other impulse mechanisms.
6 In addition to these cyclical features, a marked feature of the housing sector has been the growth in residential
and commercial real estate lending over the last decade. As shown in Figure 2, residential real estate loans (excluding
revolving home equity loans) account for approximately 50% of total lending by domestically chartered commercial
banks in the United States over the period October 1996 to July 2007. Figure 3 shows the strong co-movement
between the amount of real estate loans and house prices.
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instance, we compare the impulse response functions for aggregate variables (such as output,
consumption expenditure, and investment) due to a 1% increase in technology shocks to the con-
struction sector to a 1% increase in uncertainty to shocks a¤ecting housing production. We nd
that, quantitatively, the impact of risk shocks is almost as great as that from technology shocks.
This comparison carries over to housing market variables such as the price of housing, the risk
premium on loans, and the bankruptcy rate of housing producers. The model is not wholly sat-
isfactory in that it can not account for the lead-lag structure of residential and non-residential
investment but this is not surprising given that the analysis focuses entirely on the supply of
housing. Still, we think the approach presented here provides a useful start in studying the e¤ects
of time-varying uncertainty on housing, housing nance and business cycles.
2 Model Description
As stated above, our model builds on two separate strands of literature: Davis and Heathcotes
(2005) multi-sector growth model with housing, and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyers (2008) credit
channel model with time-varying uncertainty. For expositional clarity, we rst briey outline our
variant of the Davis and Heathcote model and then introduce the credit channel model.
2.1 Production
2.1.1 Firms
The economy consists of two agents, a consumer and an entrepreneur, and four sectors: an in-
termediate goods sector, a nal goods sector, a housing goods sector and a banking sector. The
intermediate sector is comprised of three perfectly competitive industries: a building/construction
sector, a manufacturing sector and a service sector. The output from these sectors are then com-
bined to produce a residential investment good and a consumption good which can be consumed
or used as capital investment; these sectors are also perfectly competitive. Entrepreneurs com-
3
bine residential investment with a xed factor (land) to produce housing; this sector is where the
lending channel and nancial intermediation play a role.
Turning rst to the intermediate goods sector, the representative rm in each sector is char-
acterized by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
xit = k
i
it (nit exp
zit)1 i (1)
where i = b;m; s (building/construction, manufacture, service), kit; nit;and zit are capital, house-
hold labor, and a labor augmenting productivity shock respectively for each sector, with i being
the share of capital for sector i.7 In our calibration we set b < m reecting the fact that
the manufacturing sector is more capital intensive (or less labor intensive) than the construction
sector.
Productivity in each sector exhibits stochastic growth as given by:
zi = tgz;i + ~zi (2)
where gz;i is the trend growth rate in sector i.
The vector of technology shocks, ~z = (~zb; ~zm; ~zs), follows an AR (1) process:
~zt+1 = B  ~zt + ~"t+1 (3)
The innovation vector ~" is distributed normally with a given covariance matrix ".8
These intermediate rms maximize a conventional static prot function every period. That is,
7 Real estate developers, i.e. entrepreneurs, also provide labor to the intermediate goods sectors. This is
a technical consideration so that the net worth of entrepreneurs, including those that go bankrupt, is positive.
Labors share for entrepreneurs is set to a trivial number and has no e¤ect on output dynamics. Hence, for
expositional purposes, we ignore this factor in the presentation.
8 In their analysis, Davis and Heathcote (2005) introduced a government sector characterized by non-stochastic
tax rates and government expenditures and a balanced budget in every period. We abstract from these features
in order to focus on time varying uncertainty and the credit channel. Our original model included these elements
but it was determined that they did not have much inuence on the policy functions that characterize equilibrium
(although they clearly inuence steady-state values).
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at time t; the objective function is:
max
fkit;nitg
(X
i
pitxit   rtkit   wtnit
)
(4)
which results in the usual rst order conditions for factor demand:
rtkit = ipitxit; wtnit = (1  i)pitxit (5)
where rt; wt, and pit are the capital rental, wage, and output prices (with the consumption good
as numeraire).
The intermediate goods are then used as inputs to produce two nal goods, yj , where j = c; d
(consumption/capital investment and residential investment respectively). This technology is also
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:
yjt = 
i=b;m;s
x1
ij
ijt ; j = c; d: (6)
Note that there are no aggregate technology shocks in the model. The input matrix is dened by
x1 =
0BBBBBB@
bc bd
mc md
sc sd
1CCCCCCA ; (7)
where, for example, mj denotes the quantity of manufacturing output used as an input into sector
j. The shares of construction, manufactures and services for sector j are dened by the matrix
 =
0BBBBBB@
Bc Bd
Mc Md
Sc Sd
1CCCCCCA : (8)
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The relative shares of the three intermediate inputs di¤er in producing the two nal goods. For
example, in the calibration of the model, we set Bc < Bd to represent the fact that residential
investment is more construction input intensive relative to the consumption good sector. The
rst degree homogeneity of the production processes implies
P
i ij = 1; j = c; d while market
clearing in the intermediate goods markets requires xit =
P
j x1ijt; i = b;m; s:
With intermediate goods as inputs, the nal goods rms solve the following static prot
maximization problem at t (as stated earlier, the price of consumption good, pct; is normalized to
1):
max
xijt
8<:yct + pdtydt  X
j
X
i
pitx1ijt
9=; (9)
subject to the production functions (eq.(6)) and non-negativity of inputs.
The rst order conditions associated with prot maximization are given by the typical marginal
conditions
pitx1ijt = ijpjtyjt; i = b;m; s; j = c; d (10)
Constant returns to scale implies zero prots in both sectors so we have the following relationships:
X
j
pjtyjt =
X
i
pitxit = rtkt + wtnt (11)
Finally, new housing structures, yht, are produced by entrepreneurs (i.e. real estate developers)
using the residential investment good, ydt; and land, xlt; as inputs. For entrepreneur a, the
production function is denoted F (xalt; yadt) and is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale.
Specically, we assume:
yaht = !atF (xalt; yadt) = !atx

alty
1 
adt (12)
where,  denotes the share of land. It is assumed that the aggregate quantity of land is xed. The
technology shock, !at, is an idiosyncratic shock a¤ecting real estate developers. The technology
shock is assumed to have a unitary mean and standard deviation of !;t. The standard deviation,
6
!;t; follows an AR (1) process:
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;t exp
";t+1 (13)
with the steady-state value 0;  2 (0; 1) and ";t+1 is a white noise innovation.9
Each period, the production of new housing is added to the depreciated stock of existing housing
units. Davis and Heathcote (2005) exploit the geometric depreciation structure of housing in order
to dene a stock of e¤ective housing units, denoted ht: Given the lack of aggregate uncertainty in
new housing production, the law of motion for per-capita e¤ective housing can be written as:
ht+1 = x

lty
1 
dt (1  act) + (1  h)ht (14)
where h is the depreciation on e¤ective housing units,  represents the population growth rate (the
same for households and entrepreneurs), and act represents the agency costs due to bankruptcy
of a fraction of real estate developers.10 The last factor is critical and is discussed in more detail
in the discussion of the lending channel presented below (see eq. (24) below).
2.1.2 Households
The representative household derives utility each period from consumption, ct; housing, ht, and
leisure, 1 nt; all of these are measured in per-capita terms. Instantaneous utility for each member
of the household is dened by the Cobb-Douglas functional form of
U(ct; ht; 1  nt) =

cct h
h
t (1  nt)1 c h
1 
1   (15)
9 This autoregressive process is used so that, when the model is log- linearized, ^!;t (dened as the percentage
deviations from 0) follows a standard, mean-zero AR(1) process.
10 Davis and Heathcote (2005) derive the law of motion for e¤ective housing units (with no agency costs) and
demonstrate that the depreciation rate h is related to the depreciation rate of structures. As mentioned in the
text, it is not necessary to keep track of the stock of housing structures as an additional state variable; the amount
of e¤ective housing units, ht, is a su¢ cient statistic.
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where c and h are the weights for consumption and housing in utility, and  represents the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The household maximizes expected lifetime utility as given
by:
E0
1X
t=0
()
t
U(ct; ht; 1  nt) (16)
Each period agents combine labor income with income from assets (capital, housing, land and
loans to the banking sector, denoted bt) and use these to purchase consumption, new housing and
investment. These choices are represented by the per-capita budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 + phtht+1 = wtnt + (rt + 1  )kt + (1  h)phtht + pltxlt + (Rt   1) bt (17)
where k and h are the capital and house depreciation rates respectively and Rt is the return
on bank deposits.11 Note that loans to the banking sector are intra-period loans and, because
nancial intermediation eliminates all idiosyncratic risk as discussed below, the equilibrium interest
on these loans will be unity, i.e. Rt = 1:
The optimization problem leads to the following necessary conditions which represent, respec-
tively, the Euler conditions associated with capital and housing and the intra-temporal labor-
leisure decision:
1 = Et[(rt + 1  )U1(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) ]; (18)
pht = Et[
U2(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) + (1  h)pht+1
U1(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) ]; (19)
wt =
U3(ct; ht; 1  nt)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) : (20)
11 Note that lower case variables for capital, labor and consumption represent per-capita quantities while upper
case denote will denote aggregate quantities. Also, in addition to households income from renting capital and
providing labor, he also receives income from selling land to developers.
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2.2 The Credit Channel
2.2.1 Housing Entrepreneurial Contract
The economy described above is identical to that studied in Davis and Heathcote (2005) except
for the addition of productivity shocks a¤ecting housing production.12 We describe in more detail
the nature of this sector and the role of the banking sector. It is assumed that a continuum
of housing producing rms with unit mass are owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs (developers).
The costs of producing housing are nanced via loans from risk-neutral intermediaries. Given
the realization of the idiosyncratic shock to housing production, some real estate developers will
not be able to satisfy their loan payments and will go bankrupt. The banks take over operations
of these bankrupt rms but must pay an agency fee. These agency fees, therefore, a¤ect the
aggregate production of housing and, as shown below, imply an endogenous markup to housing
prices. That is, since some housing output is lost to agency costs, the price of housing must be
increased in order to cover factor costs.
The timing of events is critical:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks and uncertainty shocks, denoted (zi;t; !;t),
is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce
intermediate output via Cobb-Douglas production functions. These intermediate goods are
then used to produce the two nal outputs.
3. Households make their labor, consumption and savings/investment decisions.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to entrepre-
neurs via the optimal nancial contract (described below). The contract is dened by the
size of the loan (fpat) and a cuto¤ level of productivity for the entrepreneurstechnology
12 Also, as noted above, we abstract from taxes and government expenditures.
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shock, !t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase
the factors for housing production. The quantity of factors (residential investment and land)
is determined and paid for before the idiosyncratic technology shock is known.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If !at  !t the entre-
preneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost proportional to total factor
payments.
7. Entrepreneurs that are solvent make consumption choices; these in part determine their net
worth for the next period.
A schematic of the implied ows is presented in Figure 5.
Each period, entrepreneurs enter the period with net worth given by nwat: Developers use this
net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase inputs. Letting fpat denote the
factor payments associated with developer a, we have:
fpat = pdtyadt + pltxalt (21)
Hence, the size of the loan is (fpat   nwat) : The realization of !at is privately observed by each
entrepreneur; banks can observe the realization at a cost that is proportional to the total input
bill. Letting  denote the proportionality factor, the cost is therefore given by fpat.
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (fpat   nwat) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
 
1 + rL

(fpat   nwat) to the lender, where rL is the interest rate on loans. As
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) demonstrate, the cuto¤ value of productivity, !t, that determines
solvency (i.e. !at  !t) or bankruptcy (i.e. !at < !t) can be used to dene two functions (denoted
f (!t;!;t) and g (!t;!;t)) which determine the allocation of the value of housing production
10
between producers and lenders, respectively. Denoting the c:d:f: and p:d:f: of !t as  (!t;!;t)
and  (!t;!;t), these functions are dened as:13
f (!t;!;t) =
Z 1
!t
(!   !t) (!;!;t) d! =
Z 1
!t
! (!;!;t) d!   [1   (!t;!;t)] !t (22)
and
g (!t;!;t) =
Z !t
0
! (!;!;t) d! + [1   (!t;!;t)] !t    (!t;!;t) (23)
Note that these two functions sum to:
f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t) = 1   (!t;!;t) (24)
Hence, the term  (!t;!;t) captures the loss of housing due to the agency costs associated with
bankruptcy. Note that that loss of output due to agency costs combined with the constant returns
to scale production function implies that the value of housing output must exhibit a markup over
factor costs. Denote this markup as st > 1 which is taken as parametric for both lender and
real estate developer so that, by denition: phtyaht = stfpat. The optimal borrowing contract
is dened by the pair (fpat; !t) that maximizes the entrepreneurs return subject to the lenders
willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). That is, the optimal contract is
determined by the solution to:
max
!t;fpat
stfpatf (!t;!;t) subject to stfpatg (!t;!;t) > fpat   nwat (25)
A necessary condition for the optimal contract problem is given by:
@ (:)
@!t
: stfpat
@f (!t;!;t)
@!t
=  tstfpat @g (!t;!;t)
@!t
(26)
13 The notation (!;!;t) is used to denote that the distribution function is time-varying as determined by the
realization of the random variable, !;t.
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where t is the shadow price of the lenders resources. Using the denitions of f (!t;!;t) and
g (!t;!;t), this can be rewritten as:14
1  1
t
=
 (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t) (27)
As shown by eq.(27), the shadow price of the resources used in lending is an increasing function
of the relevant Inverse Mills ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy) and
the agency costs. If the product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals the cost
of housing production, i.e. t = 1.
The second necessary condition is:
@ (:)
@fpat
: stf (!t;!;t) =  t [1  stg (!t;!;t)] (28)
These rst-order conditions imply that, in general equilibrium, the markup factor, st; will be
endogenously determined and related to the probability of bankruptcy. Specically, using the rst
order conditions, we have that the markup, st; must satisfy:
s 1t =
"
(f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t)) +
 (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
#
(29)
=
266641   (!t;!;t)| {z }
A
   (!t;!;t)
1   (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)| {z }
B
37775
First note that the markup factor depends only on economy-wide variables so that the aggregate
markup factor is well dened. Also, the two terms, A and B, demonstrate that the markup factor is
a¤ected by both the total agency costs (term A) and the marginal e¤ect that bankruptcy has on the
entrepreneurs expected return. That is, term B reects the loss of housing output, ; weighted by
14 Note that we have used the fact that
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
= (!t;!;t)  1 < 0
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the expected share that would go to entrepreneurs, f (!t;!;t) ; and the conditional probability of
bankruptcy (the Inverse Mills ratio). Finally, note that, in the absence of credit market frictions,
there is no markup so that st = 1. In the partial equilibrium setting, it is straightforward to show
that equation (29) denes an implicit function ! (st; !;t) that is increasing in st.
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
fpat =
1
(1  stg (!t;!;t))nwat (30)
Equation (30) implies that the size of the loan is linear in entrepreneurs net worth so that
aggregate lending is well-dened and a function of aggregate net worth.
The e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on lending can be understood in a partial equilibrium
setting where st and nwat are treated as parameters. As shown by eq. (29), the assumption that
the markup factor is unchanged implies that the costs of default, represented by the terms A and
B, must be constant. With a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for !t, this means that
!t will fall (this is driven primarily by the term A). Through an approximation analysis, it can
be shown that !t  g (!t;!;t) (see the Appendix in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008)). That
is, the increase in uncertainty will reduce lendersexpected return (g (!t;!;t)). Rewriting the
binding incentive compatibility constraint (eq. (30)) yields:
stg (!t;!;t) = 1  nwat
fpat
(31)
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in fpat. Hence, greater uncertainty results in a fall in
housing production. This partial equilibrium result carries over to the general equilibrium setting.
The existence of the markup factor implies that inputs will be paid less than their marginal
products. In particular, prot maximization in the housing development sector implies the fol-
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lowing necessary conditions:
plt
pht
=
Fxl (xlt; ydt)
st
(32)
pdt
pht
=
Fyd (xlt; ydt)
st
(33)
These expressions demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the endogenous markup (determined by the
agency costs) will be a determinant of housing prices. The production of new housing net of
agency costs is denoted yht = x

lty
1 
dt [1   (!t;!;t)] :
2.2.2 Housing Entrepreneurial Consumption and House Prices
To rule out self-nancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the household.
This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
P1
t=0 ()
t
cet (34)
where cet denotes entrepreneurs per-capita consumption at date t; and  2 (0; 1) : This new
parameter, , will be chosen so that it o¤sets the steady-state internal rate of return due to
housing production.
Each period, entrepreneurs net worth, nwt is determined by the value of capital income and
the remaining capital stock.15 That is, entrepreneurs use capital to transfer wealth over time
(recall that the housing stock is owned by households). Denoting entrepreneurs capital as ket , this
implies:16
nwt = k
e
t [rt + 1  ] (35)
The law of motion for entrepreneurial capital stock is determined in two steps. First, new
15 As stated in footnote 6, net worth is also a function of current labor income so that net worth is bounded
above zero in the case of bankruptcy. However, since entrepreneurs labor share is set to a very small number, we
ignore this component of net worth in the exposition of the model.
16 For expositional purposes, in this section we drop the subscript a denoting the individual entrepreneur.
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capital is nanced by the entrepreneursvalue of housing output after subtracting consumption:
ket+1 = phthtf (!t;!;t) = stfptf (!t;!;t)  cet (36)
Then, using the incentive compatibility constraint, eq. (30), and the denition of net worth,
this can be written as:
ket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1  )
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t)   c
e
t (37)
The term stf (!t;!;t) = (1  stg (!t;!;t)) represents the entrepreneurs internal rate of return
due to housing production. Or, alternatively, it reects the leverage enjoyed by the entrepreneur.
Multiplying numerator and denominator by nwt and again using the incentive compatibility con-
straint we have:
stf (!t;!;t)
1  stg (!t;!;t) =
stfptf (!t;!;t)
nwt
(38)
That is, entrepreneurs use their net worth to nance factor inputs of value fpt; this produces
housing which sells at the markup st with entrepreneurs retaining fraction f (!t;!;t) of the value
of housing output. Given this setting, the optimal path of consumption implies the following Euler
equation:
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

(39)
Finally, we can derive an explicit relationship between entrepreneurs capital and the value of
the housing stock using the incentive compatibility constraint and the fact that housing sells at
a markup over the value of factor inputs. That is, since phtF (xalt; yadt) = stfpt, the incentive
compatibility constraint implies:
pht

xlty
1 
dt

= ket
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st (40)
15
Again, it is important to note that the markup parameter plays a key role in determining housing
prices and output.
2.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
The banks in the model act as risk-neutral nancial intermediaries that, in equilibrium, earn zero
prots. There is a clear role for banks in this economy since, through pooling, all aggregate
uncertainty of housing production can be eliminated. The banking sector receives deposits from
households and these are repaid by funds from two sources: loan repayment from solvent housing
producers and the value of housing output, net of monitoring costs, of insolvent housing rms.
3 Equilibrium
Prior to solving for equilibrium, it is necessary to express the growing economy in stationary form.
Given that preferences and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, the economy will have a balanced
growth path. Hence, it is possible to transform all variables by the appropriate growth factor. As
discussed in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the output value of all markets (e.g. pdyd; yc; pixi for
i = (b;m; s)) are growing at the same rate as capital and consumption, gk: This growth rate, in
turn, is a geometric average of the growth rates in the intermediate sectors: gk = g
Bc
zb g
Mc
zmg
Sc
zs : It is
also the case that factor prices display the normal behavior along a balanced growth path: interest
rates are stationary while the wage in all sectors is growing at the same rate. The growth rates
for the various factors are presented in Table 1 (again see Davis and Heathcote (2005) for details).
These growth factors were used to construct a stationary economy; all subsequent discussion is in
terms of this transformed economy.
Equilibrium in the economy is described by the vector of factor prices (wt; rt) ; the vector of
intermediate goods prices, (pbt; pmt; pst) ; the price of residential investment (pdt), the price of land
(plt) ; the price of housing (pht) ; and the markup factor (st) : In total, therefore, there are nine
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Table 1: Growth Rates on the Balanced Growth Path
nb; nm; ns; n; r 1
kb; km; ks; k; c; yc; w gk =
h
g
Bc(1 b)
zb g
Mc(1 m)
zm g
Sc(1 s)
zs
i(1=(1 Bcb Mcm Scs))
bc; bd; xb gb = g
b
k g
1 b
zb
mc;md; xm gm = g
m
k g
1 m
zm
sc; sd; xs gs = g
s
k g
1 s
zs
yd gd = g
Bh
b g
Mh
m g
Sh
s
xl gl = 
 1
yh; h gh = g

l g
1 
d
phyh; pdxd; plxl; pbxb; pmxm; psxs gk
equilibrium prices. In addition, the following quantities are determined in equilibrium: the vector
of intermediate goods (xmt; xbt; xst) ; the vector of labor inputs (nmt; nbt; nst) ; the total amount of
labor supplied, (nt) ;the vector of inputs into the nal goods sectors (bct; bdt;mct;mdt; sct; sdt), the
vector of capital inputs (kmt; kbt; kst) ; entrepreneurial capital (ket ) ; household investment (kt+1) ;
the vector of nal goods output (yct; ydt) ;the technology cuto¤ level (!t) ; the e¤ective housing
stock (ht+1) ; and the consumption of households and entrepreneurs (ct; cet ) : In total, there are 24
quantities to be determined; adding the nine prices, the system is dened by 33 unknowns.
These are determined by the following conditions:
Factor demand optimality in the intermediate goods markets
rt = i
pitxit
kit
(3 equations) (41)
wt = (1  i) pitxit
nit
(3 equations) (42)
Factor demand optimality in the nal goods sector:
pctyct =
pbtbct
Bc
=
pmtmct
Mc
=
pstsct
S c
(3 equations) (43)
pdtydt =
pbtbdt
Bd
=
pmtmdt
Md
=
pstsdt
S d
(3 equations) (44)
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Factor demand in the housing sector (using the fact that, in equilibrium xlt = 1) produces two
more equations:
plt
pht
=
y1 dt
st
(45)
pdt
pht
=
(1  ) y dt
st
(46)
The households necessary conditions provide 3 more equations:
1 = Et[(rt + 1  )U1(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) ]; (47)
pht = Et[
U2(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) + (1  h)pht+1
U1(ct+1; ht+1; 1  nt+1)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) ]; (48)
wt =
U3(ct; ht; 1  nt)
U1(ct; ht; 1  nt) : (49)
The nancial contract provides the condition for the markup and the incentive compatibility
constraint:
s 1t =
"
(f (!t;!;t) + g (!t;!;t)) +
 (!t;!;t)f (!t;!;t)
@f(!t;!;t)
@!t
#
(50)
phty
1 
dt = k
e
t
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) st (51)
The entrepreneurs maximization problem provides the following Euler equation:
1 = Et

(rt+1 + 1  ) st+1 f (!t+1;!;t+1)
1  st+1g (!t+1;!;t+1)

(52)
To these optimality conditions, we have the following market clearing conditions:
Labor market clearing:
nt =
X
i
nit; i = b;m; s (53)
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Market clearing for capital:
kt =
X
i
kit; i = b;m; s (54)
Market clearing for intermediate goods:
xbt = bct + bdt; xmt = mct +mdt; xst = sct + sdt: (55)
The aggregate resource constraint for the consumption nal goods sector (i.e. the law of motion
for capital)
kt+1 = (1  )kt + yct   ct   cet (56)
The law of motion for the e¤ective housing units:
ht+1 = (1  h)ht + y1 dt (1   (!t)) (57)
The law of motion for entrepreneurs capital stock:
ket+1 = k
e
t
(rt + 1  )
1  stg (!t;!;t) stf (!t;!;t)  c
e
t (58)
Finally, we have the production functions. Specically, for the intermediate goods markets:
xit = k
i
it (nit exp
zit)1 i ; i = b;m; s (59)
For the nal goods sectors, we have:
yct = b
Bc
ct m
Mc
ct s
Sc
ct (60)
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Table 2: Key Preference and Production Parameters
Depreciation rate for capital:  0.056
Depreciation rate for e¤ective housing (h): h 0.014
Lands share in new housing:  0.106
Population growth rate:  1.017
Discount factor:  0.951
Risk aversion:  2.00
Consumptions share in utility: c 0.314
Housings share in utility: h 0.044
Leisures share in utility: 1-c   h 0.642
ydt = b
Bd
dt m
Md
dt s
Sd
dt (61)
These provide the required 33 equations to solve for equilibrium. In addition there are the laws
of motion for the technology shocks and the uncertainty shocks.
~zt+1 = B  ~zt + ~"t+1 (62)
!;t+1 = 
1 
0 

!;t exp
";t+1 (63)
To solve the model, we log linearize around the steady-state. The solution is dened by 33
equations in which the endogenous variables are expressed as linear functions of the vector of
state variables (zbt; zmt; zst; !t; kt; ket ; ht) :
4 Calibration and Data
A strong motivation for using the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model is that the theoretical
constructs have empirical counterparts. Hence, the model parameters can be calibrated to the
data. We use directly the parameter values chosen by the previous authors; readers are directed to
their paper for an explanation of their calibration methodology. Parameter values for preferences,
depreciation rates, population growth and lands share are presented in Table 2. In addition, the
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Table 3: Intermediate Production Technology Parameters
B M S
Input shares for consumption/investment good (Bc;Mc; Sc) 0.031 0.270 0.700
Input shares for residential investment (Bd;Md; Sd) 0.470 0.238 0.292
Capitals share in each sector (b; m; s) 0.132 0.309 0.237
Sectoral trend productivity growth (%) (gzb; gzm; gzs) -0.27 2.85 1.65
parameters for the intermediate production technologies are presented in Table 3.17
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the exogenous shocks to productivity in the three sectors
are assumed to follow an autoregressive process as given in eq. (3). The parameters for the vector
autoregression are the same as used in Davis and Heathcote (2005) (see their Table 4, p. 766 for
details). In particular, we use the following values (recall that the rows of the B matrix correspond
to the building, manufacturing, and services sectors, respectively):
B =
0BBBBBB@
0:707 0:010  0:093
 0:006 0:871  0:150
0003 0:028 0:919
1CCCCCCA
Note this implies that productivity shocks have modest dynamic e¤ects across sectors. The con-
temporaneous correlations of the innovations to the shock are given by the correlation matrix:
 =
0BBBBBB@
Corr ("b; "b) Corr ("b; "m) Corr ("b; "s)
Corr ("m; "m) Corr ("m; "s)
Corr ("s; "s)
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
1 0:089 0:306
1 0:578
1
1CCCCCCA
The standard deviations for the innovations were assumed to be: (bb; mm; ss) = (0.041, 0.036,
0.018).
For the nancial sector, we use the same loan and bankruptcy rates as in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) in order to calibrate the steady-state value of !, denoted $; and the steady-state standard
17 Davis and Heathcote (2005) determine the input shares into the consumption and residential investment good
by analyzing the two sub-tables contained in the Use table of the 1992 Benchmark NIPA Input-Output tables.
Again, the interested reader is directed to their paper for further clarication.
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deviation of the entrepreneurs technology shock, 0. The average spread between the prime and
commercial paper rates is used to dene the average risk premium (rp) associated with loans to
entrepreneurs as dened in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); this average spread is 1:87% (expressed
as an annual yield). The steady-state bankruptcy rate (br) is given by  ($;0) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) used the value of 3.9% (again, expressed as an annual rate). This yields two
equations which determine ($;0):
 ($;0) = 3:90
$
g ($;0)
  1 = 1:87 (64)
yielding $  0:65, 0  0:23.18
Finally, the entrepreneurial discount factor  can be recovered by the condition that the steady-
state internal rate of return to the entrepreneur is o¤set by their additional discount factor:


sf ($;0)
1  sg ($;0)

= 1
and using the mark-up equation for s in eq. (29), the parameter  then satises the relation
 =
gU
gK

1 +
 ($;0)
f 0 ($;0)

 0:832
where, gU is the growth rate of marginal utility and gK is the growth rate of consumption (identical
to the growth rate of capital on a balanced growth path). The autoregressive parameter for the
risk shocks, , is set to 0.90 so that the persistence is roughly the same as that of the productivity
shocks.
Figure 1 and Table 4 show the cyclical and statistical features for the period from 1975 through
18 Note that the risk premium can be derived from the markup share of the realized output and the amount of pay-
ment on borrowing: st!tfpt = (1 + rp) (fpt   nwt) : And using the optimal factor payment (project investment),
fpt; in equation (30), we arrive at the risk premium in equation (64).
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Table 4: Business Cycle Properties (1975:1 - 2007:2)
Data: all series are Hodrick-Prescott ltered
with the smoothing parameter set to 1600
% S.D.
GDP 1:2
Consumption 0:69
House Price Index (HPI) 1:9
Non - Residential Fixed Investment (Non-Res) 4:5
Residential Fixed Investment (Res) 8:7
Correlations
GDP, Consumption 0:83
GDP, HPI 0:31
GDP, HPI (for pre 1990) 0:21
GDP, HPI (for post 1990) 0:51
Non-Res, Res 0:29
GDP, Non-Res 0:81
GDP, Res 0:30
GDP, Real Estate Loans (from 1985:1) 0:15
Real Estate Loans, HPI 0:47
Lead - Lag correlations i =  3 i = 0 i = 3
GDPt; Non  rest i 0:47 0:78 0:31
GDPt; rest i  0:27 0:20 0:32
Non  rest i; rest 0:63 0:26  0:27
the second quarter of 2007 using quarterly data. The U.S. business cycle properties for various
aggregate and housing variables are listed in Table (4). As mentioned in the Introduction, the
stylized facts for housing are readily seen i): Housing prices are much more volatile than output;
ii) Residential investment is almost twice as volatile as non-residential investment; iii) GDP, con-
sumption, the price of housing, non-residential - and residential investment all co-move positively;
iv) and lastly, residential investment leads output by three quarters.
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Table 5: Steady - State Values: Ratios to GDP
Variables Our model Davis and Heathcote Data Data
(D & H) (1948 - 2001) (1948 - 2007)
Capital Stock (K) 1.96 1.52 1.52 1.43
Residential structures stock(Pd  S) 3.20 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private consumption (PCE) 0.77 0.64 0.64 0.65
Nonresidential investment (ic) 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.13
Residential investment (id) 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Construction (b = pbxb) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing (m = pmxm) 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.31
Services (psxs + qh) 0.71 0.71 0.62 0.63
5 Results
5.1 Steady State Values, Second Moments and Lead - Lag Patterns
Table 5 shows some of the selected steady-state values from our model that includes the nancial
friction. These steady state values di¤er somewhat from those in Davis and Heathcote (2005) but
the calibrated parameter values produce steady-state values that are broadly in line with the data.
Our main interest is in the business cycle, i.e. second moment, properties of the model. To
examine this, we solve the model for three di¤erent levels of stochastic volatility: a low level in
which the innovation to stochastic volatility has a standard deviation of 0.20, a medium level in
which the innovation to stochastic volatility has a standard deviation of 0.50; and a high level of
volatility in which the innovation to stochastic volatility has a standard deviation of 1.10:19 That
is we assume that for the low volatility economy, "  N (0; 0:20) ; the medium volatility economy
has "  N (0; 0:50) and the high volatility economy has "  N (0; 1:10) : (For all economies the
autoregressive parameter for the shock process was held constant at  = 0:90.) The results from
this exercise are shown in Table 6. We compare the second moments from our economy to that
in the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model and to the data. For the last comparison, we present a
two-standard deviation range as a crude measure of a 95% condence interval.
19 Recent research by Gilchrist et al. (2009) suggests that a relative standard deviation of 110% is not unreason-
able.
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Table 6: Standard Deviations in ratio to GDP with low volatility of variance
Variables Our model (D & H) Data (+ 2s.d.)
(in relation to GDP) (1948 - 2007)
Volatility of ! low: 20 % mid: 50% high:110%
Markup (s) 0.82 1.90 3.97 - 0.96 (+ 0.22)
Private consumption (PCE) 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.78 (+ 0.15)
Labor (N ) 0.39 0.42 0.53 0.41 1.01 (+ 0.20)
Nonresidential investment (ic) 3.17 3.74 5.52 3.21 2.51 (
+
 0.45)
Residential investment (id) 5.91 12.2 25.0 6.12 5.04 (+ 0.98)
House price (ph) 0.46 0.76 1.44 0.4 1.36 (+ 0.31)
Construction output (xb) 3.85 6.15 11.5 4.02 2.74 (
+
 0.53)
Manufacturing output (xm) 1.51 1.50 1.46 1.58 1.85 (+ 0.36)
Service output (xs) 0.98 1.00 1.06 0.99 0.85 (+ 0.16)
Construction labor (nb) 2.62 5.46 11.2 2.15 2.37 (+ 0.45)
Manufacturing (nm) 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 1.53 (
+
 0.30)
Service (ns) 0.39 0.45 0.64 0.37 0.66 (+ 0.13)
Construction Investment (ib) 2.87 5.60 11.3 25.9 9.69 (+ 1.88)
Manufacturing Investment (im) 1.05 1.04 1.02 3.23 3.53 (
+
 0.69)
Service Investment (is) 1.04 1.05 1.11 3.43 2.91 (
+
 0.46)
Note that when the stochastic volatility in the housing sector is low, the model basically
replicates the frictionless economy which, in turn, is consistent with many features seen in the
data. However, a glaring inconsistency from the low volatility economy is the behavior of housing
prices: the model severely underpredicts the volatility of housing prices. The model improves in
this dimension as stochastic volatility in the housing sector increases and, in the high volatility
economy, the model comes close to the matching the observed volatility. But success in this
dimension comes at a cost in that the volatility of residential investment is over ve times greater
than that seen in the data. The Davis and Heathcote model makes the strong assumption of
no investment adjustment costs and relaxing this assumption would moderate the volatility in
residential investment.
The contemporaneous correlations of several key variables are presented in Table 7 (for expo-
sitional purposes, we only report that values for the low volatility economy ("  N (0; 0:20)) as
the correlations were consistent across the three model economies). All variables co-move posi-
tively with the exception of house price and residential investment. This inconsistency with the
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Table 7: Correlations
Variables Our Model D & H Data (+ 2s.d.)
"  N (0; 20) (1948 - 2007)
Correlations
Monitoring Costs  = 0:25
(GDP;PCE) 0.96 0.95 0.79 (+0.08,-0.12)
(GDP; ph) 0.56 0.65 0.73 (+0.13,-0.22)
(ic; PCE) 0.86 0.91 0.61 (+0.15,0.20)
(id; PCE) 0.21 0.26 0.66 (+0.13,-0.18)
(ic; id) -0.07 0.15 0.25 (+0.23,-0.27)
(id; ph) -0.34 -0.2 0.34 (+0.22,-0.26)
(s; ph) 0.40 - 0.55 (+0.21,-0.30)
(s;GDP ) 0.04 - 0.11 (+0.33,-0.36)
(Risk Premium;GDP ) -0.06 - -0.65 (+0.29,-0.18)
data is not surprising in that the shocks to our model economy all emanate from the supply side
whereas demand shocks (say in the form of easier access to credit for home buyers) no doubt play
an important role in the behavior of the actual data. Our model critically has predictions for
two variables that are not present in the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model: namely, the housing
markup parameter, st, and the risk premium associated with loans to housing producers. The
time series for these two variables are presented in Figure 4. It is clear that the housing markup
is procyclical while the risk premium is countercyclical. As reported in Table 7, the model with
nancial frictions can replicate these features, although the risk premium is only mildly counter-
cyclical. The models ability to replicate these two features provides a compelling argument for
the inclusion of a credit market.
The last set of housing stylized facts that is in question is the lead - lag patterns of residential
and non-residential investments. Table 8 shows the results. As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), we
also fail to reproduce this feature of the data. Consequently, the propagation mechanism of agency
costs model does amplify prices and other real variables, but does not contribute in explaining the
lead-lag features.
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Table 8: Lead - Lag Patterns: Annual Frequency
Variables Our Model D & H Data (+ 2 s.d.)
"  N (0; 20) (1948 - 2007)
Monitoring Costs  = 0:25
(ic [ 1] ; GDP [0]) 0.52 0.45 0.25(+0.24,-0.27)
(ic [0] ; GDP [0]) 0.90 0.94 0.75 (+0.10,-0.15)
(ic [1] ; GDP [0]) 0.29 0.33 0.47 (+0.18,-0.24)
(id [ 1] ; GDP [0]) 0.11 0.19 0.52 (+0.17,-0.23)
(id [0] ; GDP [0]) 0.34 0.44 0.47 (+0.19,-0.24)
(id [1] ; GDP [0]) 0.31 0.14 -0.22 (+0.27,-0.24)
(ic [ 1] ; id [0]) 0.25 0.07 -0.37 (+0.26,-0.21)
(ic [0] ; id [0]) -0.07 0.15 0.25 (+0.24,-0.27)
(ic [1] ; id [0]) 0.02 0.08 0.53 (+0.17,-0.23)
5.2 Dynamics: Impulse Response Functions
While the results discussed above provide some support for the housing cum credit channel model,
the role of the lending channel is not easily seen because of the presence of the other impulse shocks
(i.e., the sectoral productivity shocks). To analyze how the lending channel inuences the e¤ects
of a risk shock, we analyze the models impulse response functions to risk shocks under two
di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, we set the monitoring cost parameter to zero ( = 0)
while in the second scenario we use the value employed in the stochastic simulations ( = 0:25) :
With no monitoring costs, risk shocks should not inuence the behavior of housing prices and
residential investment (see eqs. (29) ; (45) ; and (46) : We also examine the economys response to
an innovation to productivity in the construction sector (this being the most important input into
the residential investment good). The impulse response functions (to a 1% innovation in both
shocks) for a selected set of key variables are presented in Figures 7-9.
We rst turn to the behavior of three key macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, household
consumption (denoted PCE), and residential investment (denoted RESI) seen in Figure 7. The
response to a technology shock to the construction sector has the predicted e¤ect that GDP
increases. On the other hand, consumption falls slightly while residential investment increases;
this reects agents response to the expected high productivity (due to the persistence of the shock)
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in the construction sector. Note that the response in residential investment is much larger than in
the other two variables since this sector is most a¤ected by the greater productivity in this critical
input. Also note that monitoring costs (i.e. whether  = 0 or  = 0:25) play a rather insignicant
role in the dynamic e¤ects of a technology shock. And, as the model implies, when  = 0, risk
shocks have no e¤ect on the economy. (For this reason, in Figures 8 and 9, we report only the
responses for  = 0:25.) When  = 0:25; a risk shock which a¤ects housing production results in
a modest fall in GDP but a relatively dramatic fall in residential investment. Recall, as discussed
in the partial equilibrium analysis of the credit channel model, an increase in productivity risk
results in a leftward shift in the supply of housing; since residential investment is the primary input
into housing, it too falls in response to the increased risk. Consumption responds positively which
is consistent with models that have an investment specic technology shock (e.g. Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000)).
Figure 8 reports the impulse response functions of the housing markup, the risk premium
on loans to the housing producers and the bankruptcy rate. A positive technology shock to the
construction sector increases the demand for housing and, ceteris paribus, will result in an increase
in the price of housing. This will result in greater lending to the housing producers which will
result in a greater bankruptcy rate and risk premium; both of these e¤ects imply that the housing
markup will increase. Note the counterfactual implication that both the bankruptcy rate and
the risk premium on loans will be procyclical; this was also the case in the original Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) model and for exactly the same reason. In contrast, a risk shock produces
countercyclical behavior in these three variables. Hence, this argues for inclusion of risk shocks as
an important impulse mechanism in the economy.
Finally, we report in Figure 9, the impulse response functions of the prices of land and housing
to the two shocks. A technology shock to the construction sector results in lower cost of housing
inputs due to the increased output in residential investment so that the price of housing falls.
However, the price of land, i.e. the xed factor, increases. For an uncertainty shock, the resulting
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fall in the supply of housing causes the demand for the xed factor (land) to fall and the price of
the nal good (housing) to increase.
In ending this section, a word of caution is needed in interpreting the quantitative magnitudes
seen in the impulse response functions. In particular, note that the response of housing prices to
a productivity increase in the construction sector is greater than the response due to a risk shock.
One might deduce that the housing sector and risks shocks play a minor role in the movement of
housing prices. As the results from the full model (i.e. when the all technology and risk shocks
are present) imply, such a conclusion would be incorrect (see Table 6).
5.3 Some Final Remarks
Our primary ndings fall into two broad categories. First, risk shocks to the housing produc-
ing sector imply a quantitatively large role for uncertainty over the housing and business cycles.
Second, our model can account for most of the salient features of housing stylized facts, in par-
ticular, housing prices are more volatile than output. The lead - lag pattern of residential and
non-residential, however, is still not reconciled within our framework.20
For future research, modelling uncertainty due to time variation in the types of entrepreneurs
would be fruitful. One possibility would be an economy with a low risk agent whose productivity
shocks exhibit low variance and a high risk agent with a high variance of productivity shocks.
Because of restrictions on the types of nancial contracts that can be o¤ered, the equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium so that the same type of nancial contract is o¤ered to both types of
agents. Hence the aggregate distribution for technology shocks hitting the entrepreneurial sector
is a mixture of the underlying distributions for each type of agent. Our conjecture is that this
form of uncertainty has important quantitative predictions and, hence, could be an important
impulse mechanism in the credit channel literature that, heretofore, has been overlooked. It also
anecdotally corresponds with explanations for the cause of the current credit crisis: a substantial
20 Recently, Jonas Fisher (2007) presents a model with household production which does produce the lead-lag
pattern pattern observed in residential and non-residential investment.
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fraction of mortgage borrowers had higher risk characteristics than originally thought.
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6 Data Appendix
 Loans: Federal Reserve Board, Statistics: Releases and Historical Data Assets and Liabilities
of Commercial Banks in the U.S. - h.8. Seasonally adjusted, adjusted for mergers, billions
of dollars. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/data.htm
Total Loans: Total loans and leases at commercial banks.
Residential Real Estate Loans: Loans to residential sector excluding revolving home
equity loans.
Commercial Real Estate Loans: Loans to commercial sector excluding revolving home
equity loans.
Commercial and Industrial Loans (Business Loans): Commercial and industrial loans
at all Commercial Banks.
Consumer Loans: Consumer (Individual) loans at all commercial banks.
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), Aggregate of
gross private domestic investment (Non-RESI), Residential gross private domestic investment
(RESI), and the Price Indexes for private residential Investment (PRESI) are all from the
National Income and Product Accounts Tables (NIPA) at the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
To calculate the implied markup, s, we used the house price index (HPI), residential
investment (RESI) and the price for the RESI (PRESI).
We use the equation pht = (1  ) y dt pdtst:
 House Price Index. (HPI): Constructed based on conventional conforming mortgage trans-
actions obtained from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation(Freddie Mac) and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Source: The O¢ ce of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
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 Risk Premium: To calculate our risk premium, we used the spread between the prime rate
and the three month commercial paper. These data can be obtained from Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, FRED Dataset under the category of Interest Rates.
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/22. These two series are monthly.
Commercial rate: CP3M, 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate :1971-04 till 1997-08.
Prime rate: MPRIME, Bank Prime Loan Rate: 1949-01 till 2009-08.
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Figure 1: U.S. GDP, House Price, Non – and Residential Fixed Investments (1975:1 – 
2007:2) 
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Figure 2:  Different Loans at All U.S. Commercial Banks (1990:1 to 2007:7) 
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Figure 3: U.S. GDP, House Price and Residential Real Estate Loans 
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Figure 4: House Price, Housing Markups, and Risk Premium 
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Figure 6: Technology and Uncertainty Shocks: 
Effects on Housing Demand and Supply 
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Figure 7:  Response of Output, Private Consumption Expenditure, and Investment 
to 1% increase in Sector (Construction) Technology shocks and Uncertainty 
Shocks 
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Figure 8:  Response of Markup House Price, Risk Premia, and Bankruptcy Rate to a 
1% increase in Sector (Construction) Technology shocks and Uncertainty Shocks 
(percentage deviations from steady-state values) 
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Figure 9:  Response of Land and House Prices, and Interest Rate to a 1% increase in 
increase in Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks and Uncertainty Shocks 
 (percentage deviations from steady-state values) 
 
 
Technology Shock to Construction sector Uncertainty Shock to Housing Developer
m= 0.25 (monitoring cost: effects of agency cost) 
m= 0 (no monitoring cost: multi-sector model with housing and no agency cost) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 42
  
Authors: Victor Dorofeenko, Gabriel S. Lee, Kevin D. Salyer 
 
Title: Risk Shocks and Housing Markets 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 249 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2010 by the Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna   +43 1 59991-0  Fax +43 1 59991-555  http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 ISSN: 1605-7996 
 
